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Summary 
This paper reviews the state of thinking on the governance role of public ownership and 
control. We argue that the transfer of operational control over productive assets to the 
private sector represents the most desirable governance, due to the inherent difficulty 
for citizens to constrain political abuse relative to the ability of governments to regulate 
private activity. However in weak institutional environments the process needs to be 
structured so as to avoid capture of the regulatory process. The speed of transfer should 
be timed on the progress in developing a strong regulatory governance system, to which 
certain residual rights of intervention must be vested. After all, what are “institutions” if 
not governance mechanisms with some degree of autonomy from both political and 
private interests? The gradual creation of institutions partially autonomous from 
political power must become central to the development of an optimal mode of 
regulatory governance. We advance some suggestions about creating accountability in 
regulatory governance, in particular creating an internal control system based on a 
rotating board representative of users, producers and civil society, to be elected by a 
process involving frequent reporting and disclosure.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The boundaries of state ownership have moved considerably in modern times, 
following historical events, business cycles and of the ebbs and tides of economic 
thinking on the role of the state in the economy.  
A sweeping nationalization movement took place starting with World War I in 
Europe, as public demand for greater social control over markets followed a series of 
devastating financial crises (hyperinflation, the 1929 stock market crash, banking crises). 
Indeed, the economic downturn caused by the Great Depression led to a strong 
interventionist approach almost everywhere. In the late 1920s, the French and the Belgian 
governments established financial institutions taking control of the banking sector. In 
Germany, from the Weimar Republic to the National Socialist period, large scale 
nationalizations were implemented to foster the industrialization process. Similarly, in 
1933 - under the fascist era - the state-owned industrial holding Istituto per la 
Ricostruzione Industriale (IRI) was created in Italy in order to recover the national 
economy. After the Civil War, Spain imported the “IRI” model, creating the Institudo 
Nacional de Industria (INI), with the aim to strengthen domestic development, foster 
import substitution, and inject growth in underdeveloped areas. In Portugal, since 1933, 
the "corporative" ideology became the manifesto of the Salazar's authoritarian regime, 
which aimed at keeping political and economic activity under tight public control.  
While the process continued apace in several European countries after the World War 
II, decolonization created many new independent states eager to engage in nation 
building and to promote development through SOEs. Most of the new African leaders 
were ideologically prone to take over the “commanding heights” of the economy and 
firmly convinced that economic planning was the right policy to address poverty and 
disease (Nellis, 2005). As a consequence, several Sub-Saharan countries established 
socialist (and sometimes Marxist) regimes and based their industrial policies on large 
scale nationalizations.  
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Yet the post-war experience led to a drastic rethinking over time. Evidence confirmed 
the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, questioned the motives of politicians in 
establishing direct control for regulatory purposes and challenged the social equity of 
favouring specific constituencies at high public costs. In response, in the last two decades 
a massive privatization process of productive and other activities previously considered 
public services has taken place across the world.  
In early 1980s, the problem of the inefficiency of the SOE sector – absorbing an 
increasing amount of public subsidies – became a priority in the political agenda of most 
European countries, prompting the surge of privatizations that began in the 1980s and 
gathered momentum from 1991 onwards after the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The restructuring and privatization of the SOE sector became necessary not only to 
modernize the economy, but also to meet convergence criteria without politically costly 
tax increases. Privatization in developing countries has been spurred in the 90s since the 
IMF and the World Bank started to make their assistance and lending conditional on 
privatization. In the early period, the largest share of activity came from the three main 
countries in Latin America. After the peak in 1997, revenues declined partly following 
the East Asian financial crisis and the Russian debt crisis of 1998. The recent resurgence 
of the process in developing countries results from increased privatization activity in 
China and several Eastern European countries (Kikeri, 2005). 
After 20 years of this process, the borders of state ownership have been dramatically 
redrawn in many countries. The process has unquestionably been quite successful overall. 
The general evidence of privatization is favorable in terms of improvement in firm 
performance (see Megginson and Netter, 2001; Kikeri and Nellis, 2004).  In the case of 
Latin America privatization resulted in some (small) increases in inequality, surely in the 
short run, with the gains (efficiency and access to infrastructure) more diffused and over 
longer term (Nellis, 2000). The experiences in the Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Russia and 
other transition economies also show how a voucher scheme privatization aimed at the 
general public can get high-jacked by insiders. Privatization currently underway in China,  
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Vietnam and other countries is also expected to yield adverse effects in income 
distribution. 
 Thus the experience of privatization has led to objections and resistance even among 
early and committed proponents, who find that privatization in certain Latin American 
and Eastern European countries created specific risks and social costs (Nellis, 1999). 
To discuss the relative merits of state and private ownership we review the 
fundamental literature on ownership, discuss the main drivers of political decision 
making and draw some conclusions on what role state ownership or more generally 
public governance does and/or should play in regulating economic activity. Particularly, 
section 2 introduces our view about the basic tradeoffs of private vs public ownership of 
firms. Section 3 presents the intrinsic limits of state ownership in solving commitment 
problems, while section 4 addresses the risks of privatization in poorly regulated 
contexts. Section 5 develops the concept of regulatory governance advancing some 
suggestions about institutional development. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The costs and benefits of State ownership: a broad conceptual framework 
 
SOEs exhibit a significant lower productive efficiency in comparison with 
privately owned counterparts.
1 The main causes have been traced back to a general lack 
of accountability,
2 leading to: 
a) a lack of managerial and employee incentives to efficiency  
b) problems of competence or corruption by state authorities 
c) the use of SOEs for political purposes to cater favoured constituencies. 
 
                                                 
1 Good surveys are found in for instance in Megginson and Netter (2001), McKenzie and Mookherjee 
(2002), and Boubakri and Cosset (1999).  
2 We mean accountability to citizens, not investors. While SOEs are incorporated firms, they have no 
private shareholders; nor do lenders play a disciplining role, as SOE debt is perceived as a public 
obligation.  
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Russia provides a conspicuous example of political abuse and capture of SOEs by 
special interest groups. The power vacuum after the collapse of the Soviet Union was not 
compensated, as in Central Europe, by an identification with the West supported by a 
realistic prospect of joining the European Union. Weak legitimacy made the Yeltsin 
government vulnerable to the support of special interests, and led to the capture of state 
decisions which further undermined support. A distorted corporate and regulatory 
governance system, in which each strong interest sought to maximize and secure short 
term gains, produced a massive build-up of non-payment, tax evasion, and barely 
conceived asset theft from SOEs (Black, Kraakman and Tarassova, 2000). 
Although state ownership comes with substantial costs, two arguments have been set 
forth to justifying it in the presence of market failures such as market power or 
externalities (see e.g. Esfahani and Ardakani, 2002). The first (which we term the ‘public 
commitment problem’) concerns the inability of a sovereign government to commit to 
market-friendly tax and regulatory policies, which discourages private investment and 
may result in direct government involvement in production as a substitute. The approach 
takes the view that politicians have difficulties in credibly committing to refrain from tax 
and regulation manipulation to collect “quasi-rents” on relation-specific and often sunk 
assets. For instance, state control of infrastructure may be the result of the unwillingness 
of private investors to fund large ex ante investments whose rewards, once sunk, are 
subject to political decisions. 
The public commitment view is buttressed by considerable evidence showing that the 
size of the public sector is smaller in countries endowed with better institutions, 
especially those curbing the risk of arbitrary changes in policies, such as contract 
repudiation and expropriation by the government (Keefer and Knack, 1995). In a similar 
vein, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) find that government ownership of 
banks is more pervasive in countries with poorly defined property rights, finding support 
for Gerschenkron (1962) view that in these circumstances only the government can 
promote financial market development.  
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The second (which we term the ‘private commitment problem’) identifies the 
difficulty for regulators in controlling significant decisions by private owners, unless 
government has direct control over the enterprise (see Hart et al., 1997; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1994). For instance, state ownership of banks may arise because private banks 
take advantage of depositors or deposit insurance. Most large Russian private banks 
became empty boxes ahead of the 1998 crises, as their capital fled abroad and liabilities 
piled up. Depositors and foreign investors took large losses. In the end, the experience led 
most retail depositors to turn to state-owned Sbarbank.  
Both these rationales for the state ownership presume that state authorities seek to 
correct classic market failures such as externalities, natural monopolies, high information 
costs or public goods. Yet rather than assuming such a public objective, it seems useful to 
discuss under what governance forms there will be enough public scrutiny to ensure 
political attention to public welfare.  
In general, commitment problems apply to both private individuals and state 
authorities under incomplete private contracting and its public sector counterpart, 
incomplete legislation. The critical difference is that the sovereign state has greater 
discretion and thus greater scope for abuse. 
For example, a typical cost of market contracting is the possibility of “lock-in”. When 
the transaction extends over a long period of time and is potentially affected by 
unforeseen contingencies, one party may be exposed to the risk of exploitation when 
some relation-specific investments must be made. Under incomplete contracting, these 
costs are usually mitigated by vertical integration, i.e. assigning ownership rights to the 
parties most severely exposed to these risks. Under incomplete legislation, the greater 
scope from exploitation and abuse comes from the fact that the government can write 
rules and enforce them, exposing the private party to an additional “regulatory risk” 
which was absent under private contracting. Indeed, the government can not only renege 
a contract, but more generally can modify legislation for its own advantage. 
Thus the main argument against state control arises from the combination of broader 
discretionary powers and the potential for political opportunism. Given that many  
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developing countries have weaker institutions constraining public abuse, the case for state 
control is particularly difficult precisely in those contexts where its need may be in 
principle the greatest. 
We claim that in general constraining public abuse is more difficult than 
regulating private economic activity. Thus a more desirable governance mode implies the 
transfer of ownership rights to the private sector combined with open regulation. While 
privatization is necessary for productive efficiency, open regulation is needed to achieve 
allocative efficiency. This proposition implies that private ownership creates better 
incentives to improve firm productivity, but firms must be suitably regulated in order to 
maximize social surplus. 
There is a broad consensus that privatization usually fails to deliver much of its 
potential in poor institutional contexts, when poor regulation leads either to public or 
private abuse. Yet regulation fails just as privatization does, namely when it leads to 
regulatory or (in the extreme cases) to state capture. Good examples are the large 
privatization programs in Chile in the late 1970s, in Mexico in the 1980s and in Russia in 
the mid 1990s. In some early Latin American privatization programs, large private 
investors were grossly favoured on the privatization of the large state banks, which were 
sold on the cheap and on highly leveraged terms. This enabled these investors to fund the 
acquisition of control over a number of privatized firms. In all these cases, the abuse of 
bank resources for private purposes led to brutal financial crises, which forced re-
nationalization of most of these groups (Velasco, 1988). The Russian experience is also 
instructive in how captured privatization programs can undermine the authority of the 
state and other institutions (Perotti, 2002). In contrast, the Chinese experience of gradual 
privatization of the economy by favouring entry while retaining control over the process 
has limited private capture of the process, although it still leaves some uncertainty as 
there may be gradual retreat. 
Thus the relevant notion of non-private governance appears to be regulatory 
governance. Regulation needs to be explicit in order to expose both public policy and 
private behaviour to greater public scrutiny.  To function properly in poor institutional  
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contexts, however, the regulatory institutions may need to be developed along with 
societal institutions able to detect or respond to abuse. In what follows, we will argue that 
a grassroots form of governance may be required to create legitimacy and scope for 
increasing independence from the executive branch of government. But before describing 
more precisely the mechanics of regulatory governance and its relation with residual state 
ownership, we will try to further explore the limits of state ownership and control in 
pursuing social welfare.  
 
3. Self-interested or benevolent government? 
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987) present the classic argument for state ownership 
and control. They argue that information, contracting and bargaining costs limit the 
government’s ability to regulate by ex ante design. They also suggest that when the 
government cannot exactly determine its objectives due to lack of experience, it may 
want to retain direct control to avoid costly contract renegotiation procedures with private 
parties. To the extent that intervention has large costs, state ownership (or rather, state 
control) is to be preferred to private ownership (Hart et al, 1997).
3   
Yet the regulation of SOEs by politicians suffers serious drawbacks. First, it is 
widely known that any public institution empowered to exert control for a temporary 
purpose tends to make it a permanent task. It may thus be difficult for dispersed citizens 
to intervene to reverse state control once its purposes have ceased to exist. Second, it is 
hard to induce politicians in office to represent the interest of the electorate over special 
interests and to avoid conflict of interests. 
When voters are poorly informed or too dispersed to coordinate collective 
responses, politicians are able to pursue special interests at the cost of the common good. 
If selfish politicians are prone to corruption and patronage (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993), 
then SOEs’ inefficiency is not just due to weak incentives, but results from a deliberate 
                                                 
3 Authors in the past have argued that social goals, such as acceleration of technology transfer, increased 
employment, reduced inequality, and regional development, may be best realized via SOEs (Cholski, 
1979). The evidence on the actual role of SOEs have largely discredited this view.   
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political choice to transfer resources to supporters (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Such 
indirect targeting, distorting the productive choices, produces inefficiency (Bias and 
Perotti, 2002), such as excessive employment and wages above marginal productivity.
4 
For instance, SOEs may build plants in economically unfavorable but politically 
attractive regions (Martinelli, 1981). Other inefficient political benefits include the 
production of goods that are not socially desirable.
5 Politicians may even distort the 
regulatory framework ahead of a SOE sale, by reducing future competition, hence 
maximizing revenues (or bribes) at the cost of consumer surplus. 
Even if we abstract away from the most blatant cases of political abuses, the 
empirical record of SOEs solving market failures is quite poor. Externalities such as 
pollution were not visibly better managed by SOEs, as the environmental situation in 
Eastern Europe vividly illustrates (Grossman and Krueger, 1995).  Public monopolies 
often abuse their market power not necessarily by high prices but by sheer inefficiency, 
allowing their employees a “quiet life”, or by granting preferential treatment to political 
constituencies (Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley, 1992). This form of internal capture has led to 
such low rates of investment under state monopoly in many countries. Primary examples 
are the energy or telecommunication sectors, which often only after privatization and the 
resulting increase in competition expanded and modernized their infrastructures 
(Bortolotti et al., 2002). 
If outright ownership and control do not yield efficient outcomes, the issue 
becomes how to establish a credible time path for the retreat of the direct control role of 
the state and the emergence of genuine, more accountable forms of regulation. 
 
4. Privatization, regulatory capture, and institutions building 
 
                                                 
4 Even in the U.S., state entities employ typically 20-30% more employees than their private counterparts 
(Donahue, 1989). 
5 The development of the Concorde plane is a good example (Anastassopoulos, 1981).  
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Privatization outcomes are heavily affected by the institutional setting in which 
divesture takes place. In countries where public regulation cannot control private activity, 
the speed of privatization should be aligned with the progressive strengthening of 
institutional foundations. Where the institutional foundations to support or regulate 
private activities are completely missing, rapid privatization may lead to an unacceptable 
loss of control over the economic system. Under these circumstances, privatization 
cannot escape capture, and it may even weaken corporate governance (weak regulatory, 
bankruptcy and take-over procedures, corrupt legal enforcement) and lead to a loss of 
ultimate control over the process and its goals. Major structural reforms can thus fail 
when their design leads to regulatory or (in the extreme cases) to state capture. 
In a grand political bargain to buy out opposition to privatization, most Russian 
enterprises became controlled by managers (Shleifer and Treisman, 2000). Perhaps there 
was no other way to securely establish private property in Russia than to "buy in" the 
potential opposition. Yet it appears that the extent of control transfer to the managers 
seriously weakened the ability of the state to control the reform process. Many structural 
reforms, such as bank legislation, the sale of the most valuable resource companies, the 
public debt market, and the provision of currency hedges were implemented in a 
compromise with powerful interests. 
A spectacular example of policy capture was the debt-for-shares deal negotiated 
in Russia on the eve of the 1996 presidential elections. Via a highly dubious secured loan, 
control of the best natural resource companies was captured by a few influential banks, 
creating a number of Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs). Cash-generating companies in 
these groups were actively milked by controlling shareholders, leading to major conflicts 
with investors, and more recently, with the new Russian government.
6  The high 
opportunity cost of cash payments (because of the high appropriability of cash for 
                                                 
6 Large industrial-financial groups, common in underdeveloped financial systems, certainly owe their 
influence to political support, yet may provide governance and an internal capital market to alleviate credit 
constraints. Empirical research on Russian FIGs (Perotti and Gelfer, 2001) has shown that while group 
firms were better managed, cash flow from cash rich group firms was reallocated on a massive scale, and 
may have been shifted outside the group.  
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managers) also fed a massive demonetization of transactions and a shift to barter, an 
extremely inefficient payment system.
7  
In contrast, the Chinese experience, where the state has retained control over 
privatization and deregulation, has a more limited record of private capture of the reform. 
While its success has been attributed to its gradualism, its main critical element may have 
been privatization by favouring entry, rather than rapid transfer of control. Arguably, the 
Chinese economy had ample underutilized resources and its industrialization had barely 
began, so there were many free resources to deploy, while in the FSU reforms required 
massive reallocation of resources frozen in inefficient production. Moreover, 
considerable uncertainty remains over the future path of further retreat. 
Privatization can lead to increased efficiency and improved welfare only in 
settings with enough capacity to ensure appropriate protection of property rights, contract 
enforcement, control of market abuse, fair regulation and open entry, and commercial 
dispute settlement based on law, not payments.  
At the same time, there are enough cases of poor performance of privatization in 
some contexts to alert us to some objective limits in private control, primarily due to 
regulatory inefficiency or outright capture. When the transfer of critical assets to private 
ownership cannot be managed safely (in the sense of avoiding losing control of the sale 
and the regulatory process), public ownership (and control) can have a temporary role, 
while some process of institution-building takes place. Indeed, under uncertain public 
commitment, governments can credibly inspire confidence by selling ownership 
gradually, signalling commitment to privatization policy through willingness to bear 
residual risk (Perotti, 1995). A parallel argument may be made by arguing that the State 
should keep control over the decision rights until proper regulation is in place. In both 
cases the argument is for temporary, gradually decreasing residual cash flow /control 
rights.  
                                                 
7 Evidence that cash-stripping took precedence over productive activity is that barter rose with real interest 
rates, and with ruble overvaluation. Ivanova and Wyplosz (1999) find that both higher monetary growth 
and higher interest rates are correlated with higher barter.   
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Yet to be feasible, the structure and role of this residual ownership form needs to 
be designed from the beginning for this temporary purpose, however long it may take. 
The suggestion is that without an explicit commitment by the state to release control 
under some conditions, the process of institution building may not even start. 
Thus the State has to be progressively removed from direct involvement in the 
economy, in order to create some scope for allocating residual regulatory and 
enforcement rights in new institutions. The emphasis should be toward creating 
increasingly professionalized and autonomous regulatory institutions that draw their 
legitimacy and the right to gain further autonomy from a direct, i.e. non-state form of 
governance that involves consumers and citizens to a greater extent. 
Recent evidence (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Djankov et al., 2003) suggests 
that the most important institutions are those that restrain the executive and reinforce its 
accountability, i.e. limit abuse of power over those that regulate relationships among 
individuals. The reason may be that power-restraining institutions also correct political 
incentives to favour strong private interests, for instance to control market power, and 
thus undermine a level playing field and the process of entry by new producers.
8 
State capture by special interests seriously weakens the credibility of enforcement. 
While corruption accompanied transition in all countries, its extent in the FSU (Former 
Soviet Union) led many authors to describe it as state capture, where the corrupting 
agents hold more power than the corrupted officials. There is evidence that while 
connected firms benefit, on average, firms grow less than in less captured economies 
(Hellmann, Jones and Kaufmann, 2000).  In Russia, the private capture of the 
privatization process weakened the ability of the government to control the behaviour of 
the most powerful private owners (Perotti, 2003). 
A way to summarize the case for a further retreat of state ownership even in 
countries with poor institutions comes from Djankov et al. (2003). They argue that the 
                                                 
8 Perotti and Volpin (2003) suggests that in a context of poor political accountability, established interests 
can lobby successfully to adapt regulation and even selective enforcement in their favor, blocking entry by 
new firms. Thus institutions reinforcing political and regulatory accountability are a preliminary step to 
ensure also proper enforcement of relationships among individuals.  
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more civic capital a country has, the more it is able to achieve cooperation among its 
members without coercion. Civic capital, fixed in the short run, is determined by culture, 
factor endowments, and history. The less civic capital a country has, the less it can ‘buy’ 
order with extra regulation. Thus less developed countries can achieve less with 
regulation. Deregulation of competitive markets in less developed countries should then 
count as a high priority. The presence of relatively high barriers to entry in such countries 
suggests that regulation is often captured and thus tends to hinder growth. But just as 
barriers to entry must be reduced, the urgency to amend the regulatory institutions 
increases. We claim that this requires a deliberate policy toward greater scrutiny and 
accountability via a more directly elected form of regulatory governance.  
 
5. The mechanics of regulatory governance  
 
The bottom-line of our reasoning is straightforward. Both private agents and the 
public sector face commitment problems. Since governments are sovereign institutions, 
they have more difficulty in committing to specific decision criteria than the private 
sector. They should ideally be constrained by private ownership, and the private sector 
should be constrained by regulation. Thus the critical question shifts to the governance of 
the regulatory institutions.  
Regulatory authorities have grown throughout the developed and developing 
world as a result of privatization, and exhibit various degrees of autonomy.
9 We will 
argue here that whatever the record, the separation of ownership from regulation tends to 
generate additional open scrutiny and necessarily improves the governance of the 
regulatory process, at least as long as it is not captured. One of the most neglected benefit 
of privatization is the increase in public scrutiny arising from the fact that political 
control becomes exercised more at arm-length, or in any case through explicit legislation, 
so that its goals become more open to public opinion. This is comparable to the case of a 
                                                 
9 A common criticism is that regulatory inefficiency is less observable when buried inside a public 
institution than when it is subject to public scrutiny as public regulation of private activity.  
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firm with dispersed ownership obtaining a public listing, a move which improves the 
quality of information available to judge its management. 
In the language of Pistor and Xu (2002), laws and regulations are necessarily 
incomplete, just as private contracts are. By default, residual rights to regulate belong to 
the State. Yet the authority to adjust enforcement under unspecified contingencies could 
be granted to semiautonomous judiciary or regulatory authorities. The role of regulatory 
agencies is more proactive than courts, which may respond only after damaged parties 
bring legal action and may not intervene preventively.  
Provided that such institutions operate under a framework in which they can avoid 
being captured, granting them progressively increasing residual enforcement rights has 
several advantages over the assertion of direct state control.  
Currently the degree of regulatory autonomy is politically controlled. In 
perspective, regulatory governance could be made contingent on public approval in 
similar ways as the public sector. As long as the mandate is both explicit and focused, 
and a reputation can be established (as for central banks), such institutions have less 
power and appetite for secondary political goals. Besley and Coate (2003) argue along 
similar lines that politically appointed regulators tend to pursue unrelated political goals. 
They report evidence that US states with elected regulators in place of political 
appointees choose more pro-consumer policies.
 
The ability to ensure that regulators act in an independent and accountable fashion 
towards their stated goals can be reinforced by a novel approach to their governance. 
Their mandate should be temporary and subject to public review: their governance should 
include representatives of consumers and other nongovernmental organizations. There are 
traditional forms of institutional governance, such as in mutual banks or administrations 
of public infrastructure, in which there are elected representatives of users. This concept 
should be broadened and further experimented in other contexts as well. 
An important distinction needs to be made between NGOs and grassroots 
organizations. Especially in developing countries, grassroots organizations are  
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arrangements around specific underrepresented interests (say small farmers or craft 
makers, or neighbourhood organizations). They are usually detached from the political 
system and relatively communal in nature. In contrast, NGOs are foreign-inspired, staffed 
with more educated individuals, often driven by some strong motivation. They are better 
politically connected, or at the very least they have some access to foreigners in terms of 
either funding or visibility. Clearly, the two types of organization are complementary. It 
could be particularly interesting to create stronger links between the ability of NGOs to 
mobilize external resources or broader attention and the ability of grassroots 
organizations to mobilize support or public opinion. They should therefore have distinct 
roles in regulatory governance, yet they may also become encouraged to cooperate more 
to ensure that fundamental needs may rise to the attention of the regulatory system. 
In conclusion, we argue that the governance process of regulators should take a 
more democratic, directly elected turn.  The logic of the argument is not democratization 
per se; there are agency and common good problems to this solution as well as to others. 
The logic of this proposal reflects the sensible economic principle that those who have 
the greatest benefit from proper regulations should be at least in part entrusted with its 
governance (Hansmann, 1996; Besley and Coate, 2003). Thus the composition of a 
regulatory board may include representatives from different constituencies and 
nongovernmental organizations, elected on a rotational basis from broad lists. The 
governance assignments of individual organizations may be made temporary, and 
extensions and rotation may be made subject to public, rather than political, approval. 
Importantly, the regulators should be subject to various forms of explicit accountability 
by the establishment of specific quantifiable or verifiable goals, and they would need to 
report on an annual basis as to their achievements. A task of the external appointees 
would be then to report publicly on their view on the regulatory effort, and to contribute 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The issue of public versus private governance in circumstances of market failure 
hinges on the relative ability to commit to a fair and efficient allocation. We have argued 
that the state has on average greater difficulty in committing, due to its status. State 
ownership should remain an extreme solution, not advisable except in circumstances 
when privatization leads to uncertainty over the allocation of ultimate control. This is 
evident in the case of executive powers and public security, as in the case of the army, the 
police or the prisons. 
In countries where private commitment is hindered by poor legal enforcement, a 
case can be made for some form of state control. Yet because such environments are also 
commonly associated with corrupt politicians and unconstrained abuse of power, the 
public commitment problem is here even more serious. The evidence in the recent 
literature clearly points to institutional development as a precondition for the functioning 
of both private and public policy (see Acemoglu et al., 2003) on macroeconomic 
instability in poor institutional environments), which produce worse outcomes even after 
controlling for policy choices.  
The conclusion is that in such environments there is too little institutional capacity 
for proper state-controlled regulation, and thus the balance should tilt in favour of more 
direct state control.  
Of course, this is only a static view.  The fact that an institutional framework is 
too weak to support active state regulation suggests that institutional capacity has to be 
built up, not forsaken. What are institutions if not governance mechanisms with some 
degree of autonomy from both political and private interests? The gradual creation of 
institutions partially autonomous from political power becomes central to the 
development of an optimal mode of regulatory governance. 
In conclusion, a residual degree of state control, rather than outright ownership, 
may have a role when proper institutional mechanisms are not (yet) in place. Yet this role  
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must be progressively reduced by the creation of intermediate, focused regulatory 
institutions that may offer some weakening of the political grip on decision making. 
The separation of enterprises from ministries and their corporatization, the 
creation of independent regulators, and the resort to temporary mixed ownership are all 
policies qualifying the shift from government ownership to regulatory governance, which 
should allow a greater exposure to market discipline, better incentives in firms, and an 
increased accountability towards citizens.  
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